The Market for Real Estate Presales: A Theoretical Approach by Edelstein, Robert et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
The Scholarly Commons
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection
2012
The Market for Real Estate Presales: A Theoretical
Approach
Robert Edelstein
University of California, Berkeley
Peng Liu
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, pl333@cornell.edu
Fang Wu
Citadel Asset Management
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Real Estate Commons
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at The Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edelstein, R., Liu, P., & Wu, F. (2012). The market for real estate presales: A theoretical approach [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert
date], from Cornell University, School of Hotel Administration site: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/1007/
The Market for Real Estate Presales: A Theoretical Approach
Abstract
Presale agreements have become a pervasive worldwide practice for residential sales, especially in many Asian
markets. Although there is a burgeoning empirical literature on presales agreements, only a few papers actually
address their theoretical foundations. We create a set of interrelated theoretical models for explaining how and
why developers and buyers engage in presale contracts for non-completed residential dwellings. Given
heterogeneous consumer beliefs about future market prices, developers and buyers enter into presale
agreements to mitigate, two intertwined, fundamental risks: those of real estate market valuation and default.
Our analyses are consistent with prior empirical findings and provide additional theoretical insights for
understanding the market for presales.
Keywords
presale, hedge real estate risks, housing, heterogeneous beliefs
Disciplines
Real Estate
Comments
Required Publisher Statement
© Springer. Final version published as: Edelstein, R., Liu, P., & Wu, F. (2012). The market for real estate
presales: A theoretical approach. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45, 30-48. Reprinted with
permission. All rights reserved.
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/1007
  
The Market for Real Estate Presales: A Theoretical Approach 
Robert Edelstein 
University of California, Berkeley 
Peng Liu 
Cornell University 
Fang Wu 
Citadel Asset Management 
 
 
 Final version published in Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics (2012), 45, 30-48. 
 
 
Author Note 
 
 R. Edelstein, Haas School of Business, U.C. Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 
 P. Liu, Center for Real Estate Finance, School of Hotel Administration, Cornell 
University, 465 Statler Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. peng.liu@cornell.edu  
 F. Wu, Citadel Asset Management, Chicago, IL. 
 We thank John Quigley, Dwight Jaffee, Jack Corgel, Jan deRoos, Crocker Liu, and 
Daniel Quan and participants at the 2008 AREUEA annual meeting and the 2009 ARES 
annual meeting; and the Asian-Pacific Real Estate Research Symposium in Los Angeles, CA; 
and seminar participants at U.C. Berkeley and Cornell University for constructive comments. 
 We are also grateful to Seow Eng Ong and an anonymous referee whose comments 
significantly helped the improvement of our manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies. 
REAL ESTATE PRESALES   2 
Abstract 
 Presale agreements have become a pervasive worldwide practice for residential sales, 
especially in many Asian markets. Although there is a burgeoning empirical literature on 
presales agreements, only a few papers actually address their theoretical foundations. We 
create a set of interrelated theoretical models for explaining how and why developers and 
buyers engage in presale contracts for non-completed residential dwellings. Given 
heterogeneous consumer beliefs about future market prices, developers and buyers enter into 
presale agreements to mitigate, two intertwined, fundamental risks: those of real estate market 
valuation and default. Our analyses are consistent with prior empirical findings and provide 
additional theoretical insights for understanding the market for presales. 
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The Market for Real Estate Presales: A Theoretical Approach 
 We create a set of theoretical models for explaining how and why developers and 
buyers engage in presale contracts for non-completed residential dwellings. Buyers and sellers 
enter into presale agreements in order to mitigate the future real estate price uncertainty and 
default risks.
1
 Likewise, residential builders use presale real estate agreements in order to 
secure buyers for either un-built or under-construction dwellings, thereby assuring sales and 
frequently obtaining substantial payments in advance of occupancy. By entering into a presale 
agreement, homebuyers gain housing price security and reduced future housing search costs, 
but at the same time, they incur the risk that the developer will not perform according to the 
agreement. A presale agreement is frequently employed when the purchaser agrees to buy the 
property according to specifications outlined on the builder’s plans. In some cases, the 
prospective purchaser previews a similarly constructed demonstration model dwelling. In 
other cases, the buyer will view multimedia presentations or print literature in order to make a 
presale purchase decision. 
 Over the past five decades, presales have become a popular practice for property 
transactions, particularly in many Asian markets. Most residential condominium sales in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, China, Korea, and Singapore, for example, utilize presale contracts. In the 
United States, during the pre-subprime crisis housing boom, presales became a substantial part 
of many residential markets, including the condominium markets in San Diego, Washington, 
D.C., and South Florida. During the ensuing real estate downturn in the United States, buyers, 
                                                          
1
 Real estate builder-developers and household buyers-owners confront multi-faceted risks in building or buying a 
dwelling unit. The developer, for example, may face risks associated with land entitlements, access to utilities, legal 
challenges, ownership title, building code enforcement, labor and materials availability, weather induced delays, and 
so forth. Similarly, the homebuyer is exposed to risks related to financing costs and availability, income instability, 
job mobility, and so forth. In our analysis of the presale agreements market, we abstract from most of these genuine 
risks. We explore how the pre-sales agreements are used to mitigate two linchpin risks faced by the developer and 
buyers: the risks of market value changes and default. 
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builders, and lenders became more cautious, retreating from the use of presale contracts. These 
contracts also provide lenders more confidence to lend or adjust the loan-to-value ratio. In 
many cases, U.S. lenders now require residential project developers to pre-sell a minimum 
percentage of the project before they will lend or release funds.
2
 
 Presale contracts attract both developers and consumers since the contracts can spread 
real estate valuation risks between developers and consumers and among consumers with 
varied expectations about future real estate prices. Furthermore, presales serve as a vehicle for 
price discovery for to-be-built dwellings since the presale price contains information, among 
other things, about expectations of future real estate prices and inflation. The presale price and 
transaction volume signal future real estate market conditions and can be utilized to identify 
real estate cycles. 
 What are the benefits of a presale transaction (a spot price sale at unit completion) to 
purchasers and developers? Should the presale price be higher or lower than the price of 
existing comparable dwellings? How big a premium or discount should a developer charge for 
the presale dwellings? What factors determine the scale for presale market demand? How do 
the prices and volume of presales help us understand the hot and cold real estate markets? 
These are the key questions we will explore in our analysis. Consistent with the existing 
empirical literature, our analysis extends and improves upon existing theoretical modeling for 
presale markets in three ways. First, we employ a micro-economic market equilibrium 
framework. Our framework nests the option approach, the latter of which necessarily assumes 
risk-neutrality and the ability to create replicating portfolios. 
Second, by permitting heterogeneous beliefs across households in a competitive marketplace, 
                                                          
2
 In the United States, Fannie Mae established regulations that require most condo developers to pre-sell 70% of the 
condo units before closing deals with buyers. Previous rules required a presale rate of 51% (see Fannie Mae 2008) 
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our analysis engenders a separating equilibrium for the co-existence for the housing spot and 
presale markets. Third, we explain, in part, the real estate cycle. 
 We have included a series of interrelated theoretical models that explore the role that 
presale real estate contracts play in the pricing and risk hedging of residential real estate, 
especially for new construction.
3
 We introduce the real estate market risk (Model I) and then 
proceed to include the related default risk (exogenous default in Model II and endogenous 
default in Model III). Models I and II examine presale contracts as standard forward contracts; 
Model III is equivalent to treating presales in an option framework (in the spirit of Lai, et al. 
2004). Furthermore, with heterogeneous buyers, our model jointly determines the equilibrium 
price for presale dwellings and the scale for presale demand. In this way, our analytic 
framework creates a separating (co-existing) equilibrium for buyers in the spot and presale 
markets. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
review the literature on presale real estate contracts. “The Equilibrium Pricing Strategy” 
describes the principles of the equilibrium pricing strategy. In the fourth and fifth sections, we 
present a set of three related models (a base model and two extensions) for presale pricing, 
assuming heterogeneous buyer beliefs. In each model, by solving the joint maximization 
problems for buyers and developers, we calibrate the joint solutions for the optimal presale 
premia and the scale for the presale market. We discuss the implications of the various 
assumptions and the determinants of the separating equilibrium for the spot and presale 
markets. “Concluding Comments” concludes the paper. 
  
                                                          
3
 Our analyses are general, and, in principle, apply to non-residential real estate. 
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Literature Review 
 The presale phenomenon has generated a sparse but growing set of mostly empirical 
studies, suggesting that the apparent benefit of risk-sharing between purchaser and developer 
requires a discount for buying a housing unit in the presale market (see Wong et al. 2006, and 
Deng and Liu 2009, for a recent survey). The presale price should contain further discounts for 
unrealized service flows for the interim between presale and ultimate occupancy. Hwang and 
Quigley (2009) estimate, for the Singapore condominium market, the consumption service 
presale discount to be 1.7% annually. The view that presale units should sell at a discount to 
spot sales prices is supported by Ong (1997) and Gwin and Ong (2000), who are also the first 
to identify the potential presale market moral hazard problem. They contend that pre-sale 
housing (vis-à-vis sales at completion) has a higher incidence of defects (in the Singapore 
market). However, in a more recent study, Chau et al. (2007) find that the presales moral 
hazard risk may be offset by builder reputational effects. They also find that presold units in 
Hong Kong command a premium of6.37% over spot prices, and presales accounted for more 
than 53% of all housing sales during the period 2000–2003. An even higher presale premium 
is observed in the Taiwan housing market. Chang and Ward (1993), for example, find the 
presale premium to be 36% in Taipei during the period 1988–1990. According to their model, 
the optimal proportion of presales is 51%. 
 Assuming risk-neutral economic agents, Shyy (1992) and Lai, et al. (2004)develop two 
prior theoretical models for presales contracts, based upon compound real options. In these 
models, buyers are indifferent to the choice between purchasing a property as a presale or 
completed dwelling; the authors suggest, therefore, that the presale system creates a barrier to 
entry. Using a similar real option framework, Chan et al. (2008) observe that presales mitigate 
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a developer’s financing constraint by providing development equity and reducing financing 
costs. These models do not take into account that buyers are likely to be risk-averse (as 
featured in our model). Our model demonstrates that pre-selling a portion of real estate units 
before completion can be optimal because it mitigates developer and buyer risks. This 
outcome is the result of two realistic features in our model: heterogeneous beliefs and risk 
aversion. 
 Our theoretical approach utilizes economic market equilibrium theory, in contrast to 
previous theoretical frameworks that use no-arbitrage approaches (e.g., Shyy 1992 and Lai, et 
al. 2004). We emphasize that the presale agreement pricing is an equilibrium outcome derived 
from the behavior of real estate market participants. The standard option pricing approach 
relies upon one’s ability to create a replicating portfolio for the underlying assets; this is 
unrealistic for presale contracts since the underlying assets have not yet traded (i.e., they need 
to be built). Our model is also distinguished from other theoretical frameworks (Chan, et al. 
2008; Fan et al. 2009, among others), which assume a single representative consumer and a 
representative developer. Our analysis, by contrast, introduces buyers with heterogeneous 
beliefs about the future real estate price distribution. This assumption is reasonable and 
generates insights about risk-sharing behavior among market participants as well as the 
determinants for the scale of presale demand and the separating equilibrium in which presale 
and spot transactions coexist. 
 
The Equilibrium Pricing Strategy 
Model Set-up 
 To model the effects of a presale contract in the real estate market, we begin with a 
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simple endowment economy. The model has one period with two dates–    and     –and 
one risky consumption-good–housing.4 The housing price at     is          where 
   is a hypothetical price at    ,   , a random variable unknown to consumers, is normally 
distributed with mean zero. We further assume the interest rate in this economy is zero. 
 There are two types of agents in this economy: consumers (buyers) and developers 
(sellers). Consumers are the real estate buyers and owners, each possesses equal initial wealth 
   at    , and each will own and consume housing services from one unit of housing at 
   .5 They are risk-averse with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)6 utility over 
terminal wealth . 
      
 
 
                     
 Consumers have heterogeneous beliefs, as modeled in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) 
and Xiong and Yan (2010). 
 We model the development industry as a competitive industry with many homogenous 
firms. Each developer is endowed with a permit for housing development. All developers 
commence building at t=0 and complete construction for occupancy by consumers at t=1. In 
this simple endowment economy, the scale of developer activity is pre-determined. Total new 
development is assumed to be small relative to the existing housing stock. Therefore, the price 
of the to-be-built real estate is determined by the market of existing units. Developers can 
hedge their production risk by pre-selling to-be-built units at t=0; they produce dwellings with 
                                                          
4
 For simplicity, we use one consumption good–housing. Our results remain unchanged when there are two or more 
consumption goods (for example, housing and a composite non-housing consumption good). 
5
 As illustrated in Saini and Souletes 2005, all households start life “short” housing services. We are essentially 
modeling the first-time home buyers’ housing service consumption decisions. 
6
 Although the CARA utility does not contain a wealth effect, the main insights for our analyses do not depend upon 
the choice of the particular utility function. Another form of utility function frequently used is Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (CRRA), which also engenders similar results. 
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sales price uncertainty and may utilize a presale agreement as a future hedging strategy. Such 
analyses have been discussed extensively by Sandmo (1971), and Leland (1972), who study 
the competitive firm’s production and hedging strategies when facing price uncertainty.7 
Developers face the uncertain house price H1 and the total number of units to be developed is 
assumed to be nonrandom in this economy.
8
 
The Basic Principles of Equilibrium Pricing Strategy 
 The objectives for solving the market equilibrium are twofold: 1) to derive the market 
clearing price for the presale contract and 2) to determine the scale of presale contracts 
demand. 
 The strategy for solving this equilibrium model involves jointly maximizing the 
utilities for both consumers and developers. We first assume there is a market price for presale 
contracts, and then we calibrate the equilibrium market-clearing price that maximizes the 
developer utility functions. In the first step, we solve the consumer’s maximization problems, 
assuming housing prices for the spot and presale market are given. Since there is a continuum 
of heterogeneous consumers, the marginal consumer, who is indifferent to choosing between 
buying the housing unit on the spot market or the presale market, determines market 
equilibrium. Therefore, the critical level of mean belief   , which is a function of the market 
price of presales, divides housing acquisitions into two tiers. 
 The consumer’s consumption decision rule can be summarized as follows: 
(A1) Buy a housing unit on the presale market if                     
(A2) Buy a housing unit on the spot market if                     
                                                          
7
 This paper combines this line of literature with the more current research strand of optimal consumption. 
8
 In order to construct houses, the developers must obtain permits in advance that specify the size of construction 
and time of start and/or completion. If the quantities of production are allowed to vary, along with the size of 
forward hedging, the results remain unchanged. As established by Feder et al. (1980), in the presence of the forward 
market, a complete separation is maintained between the production decision and the hedging (forward selling) 
decision. Chan et al. (2008) also find that the presale method does not affect a developer’s production decision. 
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(A3) Be indifferent regarding the choice
9
 between the presale or spot market 
transaction if                     . 
 
 In the second step, we derive equilibrium endogenously for the market price for 
presales. Developers decide at     whether to sell part or all of their housing units before 
completion, and if so, how much is to be charged for a presale. Since all developers are 
identical and the market is competitive, the price of the presale contract can be regarded as 
being determined by the industry. Therefore, it is convenient to assume that a representative 
developer (or the central planner in the economy) decides how many units to offer on the 
presale market versus the spot market. The equilibrium presale price is determined by solving 
the problem of maximizing the expected utility of profit from both the presale and spot 
markets. The developer’s control variable is how much to charge for a presale unit. 
 With the scale of demand for presale and spot markets solved in the first step, the 
developer’s maximization problem determines the market price for presale contracts. Because 
the market scale is a function of the presale price, the representative developer trades off 
between the revenues from each sale and the number of buyers the developer attracts for 
presale and spot markets. 
 
Equilibrium Models of Presale with Heterogeneous Agents 
Presale as a Forward Contract without Default Risks (Base Model) 
 Following Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Xiong and Yan (2010), we model 
                                                          
9
 We abstract away from the consumer’s option for buying the existing housing unit at time 0. Purchasing an 
existing dwelling unit at     and leaving it unoccupied is equivalent to a consumer or investor taking on the role of 
supplier of a house at time 1. The individual can leave the unit vacant and live in it later, and can, in fact, enter a 
futures contract him- or herself with a third party and/or sell it on the spot market during time 1. All of these “roles” 
are consistent with our model and simply change the way we account for individuals who may have multiple roles—
consumer in time 1, investor in time 0, buyer in time 0, and supplier in time 1. 
REAL ESTATE PRESALES   11 
consumer heterogeneity since all consumers share the same view concerning the variance but 
have different expectations for the mean expected appreciation for the housing price at    . 
We index consumers by their mean beliefs    and assume that    is uniformly distributed in an 
interval       . The parameter   measures the heterogeneity of beliefs, which means 
consumer i believes that    has a normal distribution with mean       and variance  
 . 
The Consumer’s Problem 
 For consumer i, let   
      and   
      be consumer i’s utility functions derived from 
terminal wealth using presale and spot transactions, respectively. The price of a presale 
contract is defined as        , where    is a hypothetical housing price at     for a 
virtual real estate unit that is completed but not available for occupancy until    .   is the 
hedging premium       or discount      , which is determined in the presale market. 
(For brevity, we use hedging premium in the remainder of the text to represent the difference 
between presale price and   .) 
 Consumer i's utility maximization problem can be written as follows: 
       
       
 
  
                                                               
and 
       
         
 
  
                                                                   
 
 
  
   
              
 
  
     
 The marginal housing consumer is indifferent in choosing between buying on the spot 
market or the presale market. He or she would derive the same utility from either the presale 
transaction or the spot market purchase. Combining Eqs. (1) and (2) yields 
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 Therefore, the critical value of belief of the marginal consumer can be characterized as 
     
 
 
                                                                            
 Because there is a continuum of heterogeneous beliefs, the marginal consumer with 
mean    can be inferred from Eq. (4). The consumption decision rule, therefore, can be 
expressed equivalently as: 
(B1) Buy a housing unit on the presale market if      
   
(B2) Buy a housing unit on the spot market if      
  
(B3) Be indifferent between the presale or the spot market transaction if      
  
 For a given distribution of consumer beliefs, we can determine the scale for market 
demand for both markets. This critical level of mean belief   sub-divides consumption 
demand into two markets: the spot market and the presale market. Specifically, if a consumer 
is more bullish than the marginal consumer, he or she will choose to buy a real estate unit via 
the presale market, and vice versa. Figure 1 displays the demand scale for presale and spot real 
estate transactions. The market demand for a presale contract is 
    
  
. That is, the proportion of 
    
  
 consumers will choose buying a presale-contract real estate at    . Similarly, the 
proportion of households buying housing units in the spot market will be 
    
  
  
 As long as          there will be a separating equilibrium: presale contracting 
and spot market transactions jointly exist in the marketplace.       indicates that there is 
no spot market; all housing units are sold as presales. Conversely,      signifies that there is 
no market demand for presale contracts. 
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The Developer’s Problem 
 The development industry is competitive with many homogeneous builders, and each 
one is a price taker. The price of a presale contract is determined by all developers in the 
market. To solve the market equilibrium price of a presale contract, we introduce a presale 
aggregator, the central planer, who is risk-neutral and maximizes joint profits from the spot 
transactions and presales: 
   
 
                                                                  
where    and    are unit construction costs when the developer pre-sells and spot-sells, 
respectively. The two costs may not be necessarily the same since normally the developers 
enjoy a financing benefit for using the presales. Deng and Liu (2009) estimate that presale 
contracts enjoy a financing benefit of about 250 basis points for condominiums in Beijing, 
China. Developers usually collect presale deposits and use presale contracts as collateral to 
borrow. We denote this financing advantage as         . 
 The developer’s expected utility from profits generated by an average consumer can be 
expressed as the following: 
            
    
  
             
    
  
                             
 Note that    is the difference in expected housing price movement between the 
developer and an average consumer.    can potentially be negative, indicating a hot market in 
which the consumer demand side has a higher expectations than that of the developer. 
 
 The following first-order condition yields the optimal pricing strategy for the developer. 
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 The market equilibrium price for one dwelling unit purchased via the presale market is 
   +  
 . The optimal premium is a function of the developer’s belief about the future housing 
price, future real estate risk   , the purchaser’s heterogeneity measure, and the developer’s 
financing benefit. 
Discussion of Presale Equilibrium Results 
 Most fundamentally, Model I lays out the basic risk-sharing mechanism for consumers 
and providers. Even though it is simple, this model provides a framework with which to 
analyze market equilibrium for the presale contract price and quantity. The presale equilibrium 
price equals the hypothetical price at time zero,    plus a presale hedging premium (or 
discount)   ,        
 . The second component of the equilibrium result is the market 
demand for presales dwelling units. The critical value of consumer mean belief is solved 
jointly with    from the equilibrium. 
 
Equilibrium Price and Market Size of Presales 
 It is important to note the characteristics of the presale equilibrium and the factors that 
influence the level of the presale-hedging premium and presale demand. 
   
 
 
         
 
 
                                                                    
 Equation (9) reveals that the optimal hedging premium or discount is related to the 
consumer heterogeneity, k, the developer’s belief about housing price expected growth rate 
relative to consumers,   , the financing advantage through presale,   , and the market risk of 
the housing price at    ,   . The larger the future housing price risk or the higher the level 
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of consumer heterogeneity about the price risk, the higher the presale premium will be in 
market equilibrium. This premium is meant to compensate the developer for insuring the 
future price risk. Conversely, if the presale generates higher financing benefits for developers, 
or the developers believe the future price will be grow at a lower rate than most consumers 
think, then the developers have an incentive to reduce the presale premium in equilibrium. In 
some circumstances, the developers want to offer a presale price discount. Therefore, the 
overall sign of hedging premium,   , can be negative when    is negative and    is large 
enough to offset other two terms in Eq. (9). 
 In addition to the presale premium, a unique feature of these models is that one can 
determine the number of presale transactions. Essentially, the scale of the presale market is 
determined by the marginal consumer, who is indifferent when choosing between a spot 
market transaction and a presale purchase. As Fig. 1 shows, a lower critical value of expected 
growth rate of housing prices will induce a larger presale market. Combining the market 
equilibrium premium derived from Eq. (9) with critical belief Eq. (9), we obtain the 
equilibrium value of consumer belief,   : 
   
 
 
         
 
 
                                                            
 Assuming that buyers have heterogeneous, uniformly distributed beliefs about future 
housing prices, the market demand for a presale contract is 
    
  
, that is, the proportion of 
    
  
 
that consumers will choose when buying a presale-contract real estate at    . Similarly, the 
proportion of households buying housing units in the spot market will be 
    
  
. The presale 
demand can be written as 
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 The scale of the presale market is determined by consumer heterogeneity, market risk of 
housing prices, developer’s differentials in expected price appreciation, and developer’s 
benefits from presale. There are two interesting results to consider regarding presale 
transaction volumes. The first is the strategic role of a forward contract for a developer. The 
presale volume can be reduced if developers believe that they will be better off holding onto 
inventory and selling the projects after completion. The second is the effect of housing price 
risk. Equation (9) shows that a higher price risk is associated with a higher presale premium; 
at the same time, more presale transactions are made in the market. The two results are all 
consistent with the empirical findings in a hot real estate market in Asia during the period 
1999–2010 (Chau, et al. 2007). 
 Consumption heterogeneity also plays an important role in presale markets. 
Specifically, a higher level of consumer heterogeneity is associated with both a higher presale 
price and a larger presale transaction volume. As consumers’ beliefs about future price growth 
rates diverge, the developer can charge a higher price for presale contracts, other things being 
equal. The increased heterogeneity also creates a greater need for a hedging price risk. 
Although beyond the scope of the current study, it would be interesting to investigate what 
factors influence consumption heterogeneity. Information asymmetry and transparency are 
possible answers, which may explain why presales are dominant in emerging markets in 
addition to the higher price volatility in those markets. 
Comparative Statics 
 To understand the determinants of equilibrium results and the dynamics of presale 
transactions, we run several comparative statics. Figure 2 plots the relation between the presale 
hedging premium of and market risk at different levels of the consumer future housing price 
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belief heterogeneity. The figure illustrates that higher presale premiums are charged by 
developers for higher housing price risks. For example, when consumers’ beliefs about future 
housing price appreciation are represented by a uniform distribution [−30%, 30%] and the 
expected variance is 20%, the presale premium is 25% of    level. Higher consumer 
heterogeneity about future housing price beliefs also corresponds to a higher hedging 
premium. Figure 3 plots the relation between the size of the presale market and market risks at 
different levels of consumer beliefs, demonstrating that greater presale transactions are 
associated with higher housing price risks. For example, when consumers’ beliefs about future 
housing price appreciation are uniformly distributed [−50%, 50%] and the expected variance 
is 20%, the demand for presale contracts will amount to approximately 30% of the 
development market. 
 Figures 4 and 5 plot the effects of developer financing advantages on the equilibrium 
presale premium and market size. Figure 4 demonstrates the relation between the hedging 
premium of presale and market risk at different levels of the financing advantage through 
presale,   ; it shows that larger financing advantages will lower the presale premium charged 
by a developer. For example, when consumers’ beliefs about future housing price appreciation 
are uniformly distributed [−30%, 30%] and the expected variance is 20% and if presales 
reduce financing costs by 10%, the presale premium is 10% of H0; the corresponding 
premium is 30% if there are no financing advantages. Figure 5 plots the relation between 
presale market size and market risks at different levels of the presale financing advantages, 
  . Panel B of the figure demonstrates that the greater the presale financing advantages, the 
greater the increase in the presale market size. For example, when consumers’ beliefs about 
future housing price appreciation are uniformly distributed [−30%, 30%] and the expected 
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variance is 20%, and if presales provide a 20% reduction for financing costs, the presale 
demand will be approximately 40% of total development. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the 
importance of the presale financing cost savings. As financing savings decrease to zero, 
presales will diminish, particularly in riskier markets. 
Extensions 
 To explore the role that presale real estate contracts play in the pricing and risk hedging 
of residential real estate,
10
 we provide two extensions. We introduce developer default risk 
(Extension I) and consumer default risk (Extension II). Similar to the base case, Extension I 
features the presale as a standard forward contract. Extension II, however, is equivalent to 
treating presales in an option framework (see Lai, et al. 2004). 
Extension 1: Presale as a Forward Contract with Developer Default Risk 
Suppose that with probability p the presold real estate unit cannot be completed
11
 
at    . The value         is the proportion of the presale price lost by the consumer 
because of the seller’s default. Conceptually speaking, the loss might be viewed as the portion 
of the presale contract “deposit” that is non-recoverable, given the default. 
 The consumer-buyer’s utility from a presale transactions is thus: 
                 
 
  
               
 
 
                                     
 In the above formulation, the presale contract will be consummated with a probability 
of    , (as in the base model). In a default situation, the presale purchaser would lose a 
proportion,  , of the presale investment and would subsequently need to buy a dwelling in the 
spot market (price  ). At the same time, a consumer achieves his or her utility from a spot 
                                                          
10
 Our analysis is general, and, in principle, applies to non-residential real estate. 
11
 Developer default may relate to “non-delivery” of the dwelling unit on time or delivery on time but with 
significant dwelling defects. We assume developer default risk is exogenous. 
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transaction as 
               
 
 
                                                                 
 Equating the expected utility of a presale contract with the expected utility of the spot 
market purchase, we derive the critical value of mean belief: 
      
 
 
              
                                                
         
  
   
   
 If there is no default risk (   ) or if the presale buyer’s deposit is 100% recoverable-
refundable (   ), then the second element in Eq. (14) vanishes, and the critical value 
reduces to that which is in the base case scenario. 
 As before, the developer’s challenge is to maximize the expected utility from profits 
based on market demand from the spot and presale markets by choosing the hedging premium. 
In the case of an exogenous developer completion failure (i.e., default), presumably the 
developer would not be able to realize any revenue but may in fact incur losses from his or her 
initial investment. With probability 1-p, the developer achieves the utility as in the Base 
Model: 
    
  
                   
    
  
          
    
  
                 
 The optimal hedging premium π* can be solved using the first-order condition: 
   
 
      
               
 
 
                                 
 If the default probability is zero or the buyer’s default loss is fully recoverable, the 
default does not affect the pricing of the presale contract. Therefore, the premium will be the 
same as the no- default risk case, the base Model (i.e., if     or    , then    , the risk 
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premium reduces to that of the base case). A higher exogenous default rate or a higher loss 
given a default makes presale contracts less attractive. The transaction volume will therefore 
be smaller than those without default risk. 
 
Extension II: Presale as an Option Contract with Endogenized Consumer Default 
 We now extend the basic model by endogenizing consumer default. Assume that 
consumers secure a presale contract by using a small cash down payment at     to obtain 
the right (but not the obligation) to purchase the housing unit in the future    . The presale 
transaction can be regarded as an option contract. The consumer pays α portion of the presale 
price (the option price) to purchase the right to obtain one dwelling unit in the future at a pre-
specified price (the exercise price). The presale buyer has the legal right to walk away from 
the purchase agreement by forfeiting the deposit and will do so if the spot housing price is 
sufficiently lower than the presale contract exercise price. When the consumer decides to 
forfeit the presale contract, the maximum buyer loss is equal to the pre-sale down payment. 
The consumer’s option, however, is granted at the developers’ expense, which, in turn, should 
be reflected in the presale premium. (For analytic convenience, in the case of the real estate 
developer default, we assume the consumer’s deposit will be recovered fully.) 
 With the endogenized default option, the consumer maximizes the following utility 
function using presale contracting: 
             
 
 
            
 
 
               
   
 
 
                              
 
 
     
 
 
                              
 The first term of Eq. (14) is identical to utility in the base case whereas the second term 
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represents the call option, which has a non-negative value. 
 Subsequently, if period 1 is a hot housing market, where             , the 
consumer will proceed to exercise the presale contract; when the market is cold, where 
            , the consumer will default on the presale contract. 
 The maximum expected utility a consumer derives as the presale buyer is 
     
 
 
                
 
 
   
             
 
  
                             
        
               
 
  
 The maximum expected utility a consumer derives from buying on the spot market is 
     
 
 
               
 
 
              
 
 
      
 Again, by equating expected spot-market and presale-market utilities, the critical value 
for risk aversion will be 
        
 
 
                                                                     
         
 
 
    
         
              
   
 The corner cases: 
          , all transactions are spot sales 
           
 
 
    
           , all transactions are presales 
            
 
 
     
 The developer’s maximum utility of profits 
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        is an indicator function defined as  
        
                      
                     
                                   
 Therefore the total utility of the development industry can be written as 
 Total profit the developer obtains from both markets is 
(23) 
   
    
  
            
    
  
           
 
    
  
                                       
 
    
  
          
 The first order-condition yields the equation for solving the optimal premium    
     
         
 
 
    
  
                                   
 
    
  
            
where   ,   , and   are functions of   
 Equation (22) does not have a closed-form solution, as do the previous models. 
Numerical methods can be employed to generate an intuition that will highlight the option 
feature of presale contracts. 
 If a presale contract is written such that there are more protections granted to the 
consumer, that is, the consumer can walk away without exercising the option to buy, and then 
the presale can achieve even greater currency among consumers. Developers, however, will 
simply incorporate the option premium into the presale price. Table 1 provides a summary of 
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the analytic results for the presale market pricing and scale for the basic model, Extension I, 
and Extension II. 
 
Concluding Comments 
 Our study is one of the first market equilibrium analyses designed to provide a 
theoretical foundation for explaining the extensive worldwide practice of residential real estate 
presale agreements for uncompleted dwellings. Presale contracts benefit both consumers 
(buyers) and developers (sellers). Focusing on two risks intrinsic to all presale contracts—
market value and default—we investigate the effects of these presale risks on presale contract 
pricing. Assuming heterogeneous agents in the residential real estate market, we examine and 
explain risk-sharing and hedging effects for homebuyers and developers. We also explore how 
hedging premiums and the level of presale contracting activity are functions of market risk, 
heterogeneous beliefs of consumers, financing benefit, and default probability of buyers and 
developers. 
 In addition to developing a simple theoretical model for explaining underpinnings of the 
presale real estate market, there are at least two extensions and refinements, beyond the scope 
of this paper, that are worthy of additional theoretical analysis and empirical exploration. The 
first is to take into account the combination and interplay of high search costs and real estate 
market segmentation. In such circumstances, these market “imperfections” would create 
complex and perhaps important explanatory elements for the overall presale contracting 
marketplace. Second, most residential real estate acquisitions, including those purchased using 
the presale contract, require third-party financing. The interactions created by the presale 
contract between and among the lender, buyer, and seller are likely to be fraught with complex 
risk-sharing behavior, with substantive moral hazard and adverse selection risks. Untangling 
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these risks through innovative lending contracts is an area ripe for future research. 
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Table 1. Comparative model analysis. This table compares the equilibrium price and quantity of presale contracts under the 
assumption of heterogeneous beliefs. The base model treats presale as a forward contract without considering default risks. 
Extension I treats presale as a forward contract with exogenous default risks. Extension II further endogenizes consumer default and 
treats the presale as an option contract. The three models of presale assume a two-period endowment economy with two types of 
CARA-utility agents: heterogeneous consumers and homogeneous developers in real estate industry. The future housing price    is 
assumed as normally distributed with mean        and standard deviation of  . The price of a presale contract is defined as 
       , where    is a hypothetical housing price at     for a virtual real estate unit that is completed but not available for 
occupancy until    .   is the hedging premium (   ) or discount (   ), which is determined in the presale market. Other 
variables used in Table 1 are as the following:   
  
   
, where   is default probability of timely construction and   is loss severity. 
 Base model Extension I Extension II 
Market Description Presale as a Forward Contract 
No Default Risks 
Presale as a Forward Contract With 
Exogenous Default Risks 
Presale as an Option Contract With 
Endogenized Consumer Default 
Equilibrium Quantity of 
Presales is   
    
  
  
Where the Critical Consumer 
Belief is    
      
 
 
           
 
 
         
        
  
   
  
        
 
 
        
           
 
 
    
         
             
    
Equilibrium Price of Presales 
is        
   
   
 
 
         
 
 
       
 
 
               
 
   
     
      
 
No closed-form solution Solved by 
numerical method. 
Where the Optimal Hedging 
Premium is    
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Figure 1. Equilibrium distribution of real estate demand in the presence of presale contracts. 
Under uniform distribution of consumer beliefs, the marginal consumer-buyer separates the 
total real estate demand into the presale market and the spot market. More bullish buyers will 
enter the presale market whereas bearish buyers trade on the spot market. 
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Figure 2. Equilibrium hedging premium with different levels of consumer beliefs. This figure 
plots the relationship between the hedging premium of presales and market risk at different 
levels of consumer heterogeneity in beliefs about future housing price. It shows that higher 
presale premiums are charged by developers for higher housing price risks. For example, when 
consumers’ beliefs about future housing price appreciation fall in a uniform distribution 
[−30%, 30%] and expected variance is 20%, the presale premium is 25% of    level. In 
addition, the higher the consumer heterogeneity in beliefs about future housing price, the 
higher the hedging premium. 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium presale market size with different levels of consumer beliefs. This 
figure plots the relationship between the size of the presale market and market risks at 
different levels of consumer heterogeneity in beliefs about future housing price. It shows that 
greater presale transactions are associated with higher housing price risks. For example, when 
consumers’ beliefs about future housing price appreciation fall in a uniform distribution 
[−50%, 50%] and expected variance is 20%, the presale demand is approximately 30% of the 
development size. In addition, the higher the consumer heterogeneity in beliefs about future 
housing price, the greater the market size of presales. 
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Figure 4. Equilibrium hedging premium with different levels of presale financing advantage. 
This figure plots the relationship between the hedging premium of presale and market risk at 
different levels of the financing advantage through presale,       It shows that the bigger the 
financing advantage of presale, the lower the presale premium charged by a developer. For 
example, when consumers’ beliefs about future housing price appreciation fall in a uniform 
distribution [−30%, 30%] and expected variance is 20%, and if presale provides a 10% cost 
reduction via a financing channel, the presale premium is 10% of the    level; the 
corresponding premium is 30% if there are no financing advantages. 
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Figure 5. Equilibrium presale market size with different levels of presale financing advantage. 
Panel B plots the relationship between size of the presale market and market risks at different 
levels of the financing advantage through presale,       It shows that a greater presale 
financing advantage corresponds to a bigger presale market. For example, when consumers’ 
beliefs about future housing price appreciation fall in a uniform distribution [−30%, 30%] and 
the expected variance is 20%, and if presales provide a 20% cost reduction via a financing 
channel, the presale demand is approximately 40% of the development size. 
 
